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Four Pillars of Statisticalism
Denis M. Walsh, André Ariew,y Mohan Matthenz
Over the past ﬁfteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what
theoretical population dynamicmodels tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift.
On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On
the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statisti-
cal parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without
identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical descrip-
tion of population change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is
to provide a deﬁnitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in
the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They
are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order eﬀect; 2. Trait ﬁtness is primitive; 3. Modern
Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative.
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1 Introduction
Models of evolutionary population dynamics represent changes in the structure of evolving pop-
ulations in terms of selection, drift, and ﬁtness.1 There is a range of such models, from the
Wright-Fisher equations of population genetics, to those of quantitative genetics, to the Price
and breeders’ equations. They vary in their structure and the concepts they deploy, but the
1There are other explanatory factors, including mutation and migration. For convenience, we restrict
our attention to selection and drift here, in order to concentrate on the issues raised in the debate so far,
but we recognize that there are important things to be said about migration and mutation. We thank an
anonymous referee for raising this point.
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common denominator is that in all of them ﬁtness explains and predicts change in population
structure. A population that varies in ﬁtness is said to be undergoing selection. When the ac-
tual amount of change in such a population diﬀers from the expected change, the population
is said to manifest drift. Over the past ﬁfteen years there has been a considerable amount of
debate about what theoretical population dynamics models tell us about the biological reality of
selection and drift. Two major positions have emerged, the causal and the statistical.
The orthodox, causal approach recommends that these models should be interpreted as de-
scriptions of the causes of population change. On this view, natural selection and drift are forces,
or causal processes, that propel a population through changes in trait frequencies (Sober 1993).
Variation in trait ﬁtness is a measure of the strength of selection. The degree of divergence from
the expected change in trait frequencies measures the eﬃcacy of drift.
Selection and drift, on this view are independent and proprietary population-level causes of
population change (Sober 1993; Stephens 2004). By ‘independent’ we mean that the minimal
conditions suﬃcient for selection to occur can obtain without those that are suﬃcient for drift
(and vice versa). They are proprietary in the sense that each process—selection and drift—has
its own distinct kind of eﬀect, each called after its supposed cause. There is thus a distinction
to be made between selection the process (which is the cause) and selection the product (which
is the eﬀect), and similarly between drift the process and drift the product (Millstein 2002;
Stephens 2004). The important point is that on this orthodox causal approach, the population
models that quantify the degree of selection and drift in a population do so by articulating and
diﬀerentiating the population-level causes of evolutionary change.2
The statistical interpretation cautions against reading population models in this way. Ac-
cording to statisticalists, the models of population dynamics provide us with a set of statistical
parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, but they do not
do so by representing selection and drift as discrete, separable causal processes. Selection is a
measure of how much change is to be expected in the frequency of a gene or a trait; drift is a
measure of the divergence of the actual change from the expectation.
While the debate between the orthodox and statistical factions has been vigorous, it has not
always been particularly productive or germane. This is due, in some measure, to widespread
misapprehensions of the statisticalist position. These, in turn, may arise from the fact that the
core commitments of the statisticalist position have never been fully assembled and articulated.
Rather, the precepts of the statisticalist view are spread throughout an array of papers by various
(combinations of ) authors. And, as with its causalist counterpart, the various presentations
of statisticalism may encompass a range of minor variations. Our objective here is to state as
clearly and simply as possible what we take to be the shared core commitments of the statistical
interpretation. First, some context is needed. We oﬀer some background to statisticalism in
Sections 2 and 3, before proceeding to an articulation of its central tenets in Section 4.
2 Darwinian andModern Synthesis Selection
Organisms live, die, reproduce, and pass on their heritable traits to their oﬀspring (sometimes in
mutated form); they immigrate and emigrate. Darwin’s great insight was that in the aggregate
these events are suﬃcient to account for the ﬁt and diversity of organic form. Darwin reasoned
that as a consequence of all this living, reproducing, and (imperfect) inheriting of traits, pop-
2There are variants on this. In one version of the orthodox approach natural selection and drift are
said to be two vector forces of evolutionary change (Sober 1993; Millstein 2006; Hitchcock and Velasco
2014). A further variant contends that natural selection is a force, but drift is not (Brandon 2006).
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ulations change in their structure. In fact, populations undergo a number of diﬀerent kinds
of changes. They change in their lineage structure; as some organisms produce more oﬀspring
than others, their lineages increase their representation in the population. Furthermore, pop-
ulations undergo changes in their trait distribution; some trait types increase in their relative
frequency with respect to others. Additionally, populations change in their adaptedness; they
come to comprise individuals in general better suited to surviving and reproducing in their con-
ditions of existence.3 Quite frequently, these changes march in step, which has led to the tacit
supposition that they are the same process and are explained in the same way. But this is a
mistake. Changes in lineage structure and in trait distribution require (or use) diﬀerent kinds
of explanatory models.
In order to explain or predict change in lineage structure from one time to the next, we
need to know the propensity of individuals to survive and reproduce.4 In order to recognize,
quantify and predict a population’s change in trait distribution, we need to know something
else. We need to be able to divide the population into abstract trait classes (or ‘trait types’). We
do this, for each heritable trait, by collecting together all those individuals that share that trait.
The population of trait classes cross-classiﬁes the population of individuals—each trait class has
many individuals as members, and each individual is a member of many trait classes. Having
constructed these abstract classes—trait types—we need to assign to them a parameter that will
enable us to account for the population’s change in trait distribution. The parameter represents
the predicted growth rate of the trait type in the ensemble (Matthen and Ariew 2002). Only
with knowledge of these growth rates can we predict and explain the change in a population’s
trait distribution.
The information required to explain change in trait distribution is more or less irrelevant to
the understanding of change in lineage structure and vice versa. Given information about the
propensities of individuals to survive and reproduce, we do not need to know anything about
which trait classes they fall into in order to predict and explain the increase in prevalence of
one lineage over another. Conversely, if we know the relative growth rates of the abstract trait
types, we need no further information about the propensities of individual organisms in order
to account for the change in trait distribution (Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Walsh 2003).
We don’t have to know which individuals belong to which trait classes, the ecological conditions,
which particular individuals survive and reproduce, or who begets whom. Nor is the minimum
information suﬃcient to explain change in trait distribution suﬃcient to explain change in lin-
eage structure. Changes in lineage structure and changes in trait distribution are thus diﬀerent
kinds of changes that result from the aggregated activities of organisms in a population. As
such, they require diﬀerent models, with diﬀerent theoretical parameters.
Unfortunately, the corresponding theoretical parameters of these diﬀerent models share a
name: ‘ﬁtness.’ ‘Fitness’ is a crucial theoretical term in evolutionary theory, but an ambiguous
one. It can stand variously for a causal property (a propensity) of a concrete entity, an organism.
Or it can stand for the growth rate of an abstract trait type. In order to disambiguate the term,
3In what follows wewill concentrate on the relation between change in trait distribution and change in
lineage structure. Walsh, Lewens, andAriew (2002) andWalsh (2003) demonstrate that these are not the
same process. There can be change in the lineage structure of a population that is explained and predicted
by variation in individual ﬁtness, even when there is no change in trait distribution (and no variation in
trait ﬁtness). Earnshaw-Whyte (2012) demonstrates that predictable change in trait distribution can
occur without variation in individual survival and reproduction. Kaufmann (2003) demonstrates that
change in either lineage or trait distribution under natural selection does not necessarily lead to change
in adaptedness.
4This is what Matthen and Ariew (2002) call ‘vernacular’ ﬁtness.
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we’ll call them ‘vernacular ﬁtness’ and ‘trait ﬁtness’ respectively.5
The disambiguation is important for an obvious reason. It has become a commonplace to
characterize natural selection as that process that occurs in a population when there is variation
in ﬁtness (Lewontin 1974; Godfrey-Smith 2007). If ‘ﬁtness’ is polysemous, then ‘variation in
ﬁtness’ also has no univocal meaning. If, in turn, ‘natural selection’ is deﬁned in terms of vari-
ation in ﬁtness, then there should be a corresponding ambiguity in the term ‘natural selection’;
and there is. The process of selection that Darwin postulated is in essence the change in lineage
structure that occurs when there is variation in vernacular ﬁtness.6 Accordingly, we shall call
this phenomenon ‘Darwinian selection’ (or ‘D-selection’). The other process, in which popula-
tions change in their trait distribution as a function of variation in their trait ﬁtnesses, we’ll call
‘Modern Synthesis selection’ (or ‘MS-selection’).
An evolutionary model is a description that represents the dynamics of a population by
citing variations in ﬁtness. So, if there are two kinds of ﬁtness, there ought to be two kinds
of evolutionary models; and there are. One kind represents changes in the lineage structure
of a population as a function of variation in vernacular ﬁtness. These models articulate the
individual-level, ‘ecological’ causes of population change. The other kind represents changes in
trait distribution as a function of variations in trait ﬁtness. In keeping with our conventions,
we’ll call the former ‘D-models’ and the latter ‘MS-models,’ to mark the fact that they employ
the statistical concepts pioneered by Fisher and others at the inception of theModern Synthesis.
MS-selectionmodels arose out of the realization that D-selectionmodels of evolution are in-
complete. By the early 20th century, evolutionary biologists understood that one cannot explain
and predict the magnitude and direction of evolutionary change in trait distribution solely from
the survival and reproduction of individuals. We must know the rates of change in relative fre-
quency of the trait types. For that, extra information is typically required, including the eﬀects
of inheritance, details of reproductive schedules, mutation and migration rates, demographic
factors such as the size and growth rate of the population as a whole, and the composition of
variation. MS-selection models were constructed to meet these technical challenges. The ob-
jective of these MS-models is to analyze and predict population-level trends in trait frequencies
(Nowak 2006; Ariew and Lewontin 2004). Through the work of seminal investigators includ-
ing RA Fisher, Sewell Wright, and JBS Haldane, key concepts of evolution, including selection,
mutation, variation, were embedded in the mathematical framework of MS-models.
A number of authors evince an understanding of the diﬀerence between explaining changes
in trait distribution by employing MS-models, and citing the individual-level causes of those
changes. Wade and Kalizs (1990) distinguish between ‘selection models’—those that posit an
association between change in mean character value and selection gradient—on one hand, and
causal studies of selection on the other. The distinction is also implicit in Sober’s (1993) inﬂu-
ential discussion of evolutionary ‘source laws’ and ‘consequence laws.’
Whereas it is mainly ecology that tries to provide source laws for natural selection,
the consequence laws concerning natural selection are preeminently part of the
province of population genetics. It doesn’t matter to the equations in population
geneticswhy a given population is characterized by a set of selection coeﬃcients ….
5Matthen and Ariew (2002) use the terms ‘vernacular’ ﬁtness and ‘predictive’ ﬁtness to mark the same
distinction.
6He further stipulated, in eﬀect, that when lineages vary with respect to the trait classes they are
members of, the population will change in its trait distribution too: “… any variation, … if it be in any
degree proﬁtable to an individual of any species, … will tend to the preservation of that individual, and
will generally be inherited by its oﬀspring” (1872, 61).
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These values may just as well have dropped out of the sky. (Sober 1993, 59)
Similarly, Okasha gestures toward the diﬀerence between the models of population dynamics
and the explanation of the ecological causes of evolutionary change.
Population genetics models are (deliberately) silent about the causes of the ﬁtness
diﬀerences between genotypes whose consequences they model. […] To fully un-
derstand evolution, the ecological factors that lead to these ﬁtness diﬀerences must
also be understood. (Okasha 2015, emphasis in original)7
The important point is that explaining changes in trait distribution and explaining the ecological
causes of population change are diﬀerent projects. They call for very diﬀerent kinds of models:
MS-models and D-models respectively.
Much of the confusion in the debate between the causal and statistical interpretations stems
from the failure to appreciate the distinction betweenD-models andMS-models. Statisticalism
is a thesis about the interpretation of MS-models. It has nothing to say about D-models. With
the distinction between D-models andMS-models to hand, we can nowmake a ﬁrst—crucial—
clariﬁcation: The debate between causalists and statisticalists, properly construed, is exclusively about
the interpretation of MS-models.
3 Statisticalism
Statisticalism encompasses two positive claims and a negative claim.
Positive Claim #1: MS-models cite statistical properties of trait types.
Positive Claim #2: MS-models explain changes in trait distribution.
Negative Claim: MS-models do not cite the causes of population change.8
A strong strain of statisticalism can be found in the writings of Levins and Lewontin (1985) and
Marjorie Grene (1961). Grene is explicit: she insists that “ … we must … distinguish between
‘genetical selection,’ which is purely statistical, and Darwinian selection which is environment-
based and causal. They remain two distinct concepts with a common name” (Grene 1961, 31).
The distinction that Grene highlights is as follows. In developing his theory of natural
selection, Darwin appeals to certain causal intuitions about the consequences for a population
of individuals succeeding diﬀerentially in the struggle for existence. In the ﬁrst four chapters
of The Origin, Darwin presents a series of thought experiments designed to convince us that
variation in organisms’ ability to succeed in the struggle for existence can lead to population
change (Lennox 1991). In developing the ‘GeneticalTheory of Natural Selection,’ Fisher (1930)
doesn’t appeal to causal intuitions at all. Instead he draws upon statistical intuitions (which are,
admittedly, harder to come by) concerning what should happen to a population in which there
is additive variance in the growth rates of its abstract types. Margaret Morrison nicely captures
the core of Fisher’s statistical method:
7We thank Fermín Fulda for drawing these passages to our attention. See Fulda (2017). We also
thank an anonymous referee for pointing to the commonalities.
8To ﬁll this out a little more: MS-models do not cite the causes of population change, which are all
events involving individual organisms. These models aggregate the individual level causes of population
change, and appeal to their statistical properties.
 open access - ptpbio.org
walsh, ariew, matthen: four pillars 6
Essentially, he treated large numbers of genes in a similar way to the treatment of
large numbers of molecules and atoms in statistical mechanics. By making these
simplifying and idealizing assumptions, Fisher was able to calculate statistical av-
erages that applied to populations of genes in a way analogous to calculating the
behavior of molecules that constitute a gas. (Morrison 2002, 58–59, emphasis in
original)
Where Darwin characterizes evolution as an aggregate causal consequence of the actions of
individual organisms (“all these things follow inevitably from the struggle for existence”), Fisher
describes evolutionary population change as an analytic consequence of the statistical structure
of a population of abstract entities, trait types (or, as he called them, ‘gene ratios’). For instance,
his fundamental theorem says: “The rate of increase of ﬁtness of any [population] at any time
is equal to the additive genetic variance at that time” (Fisher 1930, 36). Again, Grene is keenly
aware of the implications: “In terms of the ‘strictly deﬁned’ concepts it uses, the fundamental
theorem is not a theorem of natural selection, but a statistical device for recording and predicting
population changes” (1961, 30).
Grene’s distinction between ‘genetical selection’ and ‘Darwinian selection’ provides an his-
torical precedent for statisticalism. She advocates Positive Claim #1 and the Negative Claim
(above), but prescinds from Positive Claim #2. Unlike Grene, contemporary statisticalists also
argue for Positive Claim #2—whileMS-models do not identify the causes of population change,
they are nevertheless genuinely explanatory (Matthen and Ariew 2002; Walsh, Lewens, and
Ariew 2002). Statisticalists are thus committed to a class of statistical, non-causal explanations
(Ariew et al. 2014; Walsh 2013, 2015; Matthen and Ariew 2009).9 The plausibility of statisti-
calism rests on its ability to demonstrate that while change in trait distribution is caused by the
capacities of individual organisms to survive and reproduce, it is nevertheless explained (and not
caused) by the statistical properties (ﬁtnesses) of abstract trait types. The task of promoting sta-
tisticalism is the task of making Positive Claim #1, Positive Claim #2, and the Negative Claim
more palatable. Statisticalists have oﬀered a variety of diﬀerent arguments, each of which is
aimed at supporting some subset of the three claims.10 More importantly, behind each of the
arguments there are four core commitments, which as yet have gone unarticulated.
4 Four Core Commitments
The four core commitments of statisticalism are:
i. Natural selection is a higher order eﬀect.
ii. Trait ﬁtness is a primitive concept.
iii. MS-models are substrate neutral.
iv. MS-selection and drift are model-relative; that is to say, a population can be said to be
undergoing MS-selection and/or drift only relative to an MS-model.
These are the four pillars on which the statistical interpretation rests.11
9Note statisticalists do not deny that any instance of evolutionary change involves causal events. They
do deny that MS-selection explanations appeal to them.
10It is not our objective to rehearse them all here.
11Elliott Sober has helpfully pointed out that many causalists hold to some proper subset of these.
That is true, but we maintain that only statisticalism is consistent with all four.
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Natural selection is a higher order eﬀect.
There are basically just two kinds of change to individuals that can bring about evolutionary
changes in the trait distribution of a population (Earnshawe-Whyte 2012). Organisms may
leave a population, or they may enter. (We leave aside for now the changes in trait distribution
that may be initiated by individuals changing their traits, through mutation, non-Mendelian
segregation, or lateral gene transfer.) Organisms leave a population by emigrating or by dying.
Organisms enter a population by immigrating or by being born (hatched, germinated, budded—
whatever). Systematic changes in the trait distribution of a population occur when the entry and
departure of individuals is biased. Roughly speaking, when disproportionately more individuals
possessing traits of one type leave or enter than individuals possessing traits of another type, a
change in the population’s trait distribution ensues.
To amplify: evolutionary changes in population trait distribution are analytic consequences
of the activities of organisms.12 The idea is captured by an analogy oﬀered byMatthen andAriew
(2009). Suppose two particles, p1 and p2, in a container are moving away from one another
at a constant velocity, such that their centre of mass, c, remains at a constant location with
respect to the container. Now imagine that one particle, p1, contacts the wall of the container
and rebounds back, while p2 continues on its original trajectory. Instantaneously, c changes its
location. Its change in location is a consequence of the change in relative motion of p1 and p2.
Yet there is no signal sent from p1 and p2 that causes the location of c to change. There couldn’t
be; since the change is instantaneous, a signal would have to travel faster than the speed of light.
Nor does there need to be. The location of c is entailed by the locations of p1 and p2. It is
an analytic consequence: a function of the straight-line distance between p1 and p2 and their
masses. Nothing is required to push, pull, attract or repel c directly, other than whatever causes
the motions of p1 and p2. In this respect, the motion of c is also a higher order eﬀect of the
motions of p1 and p2. It is a change in the property of a system (the centre of mass of the system
comprising p1 and p2) that results from causes acting on the system’s components severally.
One of the striking features of higher order eﬀects is that often large-scale trends or reg-
ularities can be seen by aggregating individual activities that could not be observed simply by
following the behaviours of individuals separately. Consider Erwin Schrödinger’s (1944) ex-
planation of diﬀusion. If we place a drop of potassium permanganate in a volume of water it
diﬀuses. The solution goes from a state in which there is a highly localized, deeply coloured
purple area in an otherwise clear volume of water to an equilibrium state in which the entire
solution is an evenly coloured light pink. Schrödinger explains diﬀusion in the following way.
He asks us to imagine dropping a membrane into the solution some time before it has reached
equilibrium. The motions of the individual permanganate molecules are random and unbiased.
No molecule has more of a propensity to move in one direction than another. In such a sit-
uation, Schrödinger says, we would expect to observe that more molecules contact the barrier
from the high density side than from the low density side. This is simply because there are
more of them on the high density side. This means, then, that at any time prior to equilibrium,
there will be more molecules traveling from high-density to low density than the other way
around. The gross eﬀect, summed over all these random motions, is that the solution will tend
steadily, inexorably toward an equilibrium (even) distribution. Diﬀusion is a higher order eﬀect.
It is the consequence for an assemblage of the aggregate of the several causes of the motions of
individual molecules.
Two morals can be drawn from the diﬀusion analogy, one metaphysical, the other method-
ological. The metaphysical lesson is that one need not posit higher-order causes in order to
12The idea that this consequence is analytic is nicely presented by Neil Tennant (2014).
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explain a higher order eﬀect (Matthen 2010). There is no diﬀusive force. All the causing goes
on at the individual level, despite the fact that the regularity is only observable at the ensemble
level. The methodological moral is that higher order eﬀects elicit a special kind of explanation:
a higher order eﬀect explanation. In order to explain the eﬀect of the aggregate of individual-
level causes we do not need to enumerate or articulate those individual-level causes severally.
All that is required for the explanation is the distribution of these causes. Whatever the causes
of molecular motion, there are more causing the motion from high density to low than vice
versa.13
The statistical interpretation takes MS-selection to be a higher order eﬀect. MS-selection
is a change in the trait distribution of a population that results from the causes of individual
birth, death, reproduction, mutation, and migration. Darwin’s great conceptual breakthrough
in the discovery of natural selection is that all the causes of descent with modiﬁcation are already
contained within the ‘struggle for existence,’ the day-to-day activities of organisms. Nothing is
required to cause evolution other than that which causes the survival, reproduction, inheritance,
mutation, death, emigration and immigration of organisms in a population. Organisms survive,
reproduce and die, enter and leave. As they do their trait tokens enter, stay in, or leave the
population. As a consequence, some trait types increase in frequency relative to others.
To sum up, the statistical interpretation holds that the explanation of evolutionary popula-
tion dynamics—that is to say, change in trait distribution—is a higher order eﬀect explanation.
Trait types change in their relative frequency as an analytic consequence of individual-level
causes. An MS-model does not advert to the individual-level causes of population change. In-
stead it cites the distribution of those causes.
It is important to note that statisticalists do not deny that higher order eﬀects can have
individual-level causal explanations. For example, a satisfactorily complete individual-level
causal explanation of why a particularDrosophila melanogaster population evolved a fuzzy thorax
might cite a suite of multifarious causes for individuals and their kin over a number of genera-
tions. These may include the causes of survival, deaths, immigration, emigration, reproduction,
and inheritance of characteristics, the typical eﬀect of a fuzzy thorax on life history, etc. This
would account for the change in lineage structure. It would be a perfectly good example of
what Sober (above) refers to as an ‘ecological’ explanation. So long as we can, further, assign
trait types to lineages, we can use this information to explain why change in lineage structure
eventuates in change in trait distribution. In these individual-level causal explanations there is
no need to refer to any probabilities or statistical distributions at all, there are no trait ﬁtness
ascriptions, or sample errors needed. What statisticalists deny is that such an explanation is an
MS-explanation.
One might conclude that in the instances where we want to know why a particular popula-
tion actually evolved a change in distribution of a trait (as in the Drosophila case) an individual-
level explanation should be favored over an MS-explanation (Rosenberg 2006; Ariew 1998;
Sober 1993; Pence and Ramsey 2015). This might generally be correct. There may be no need,
for example, for an MS-model to explain the evolution of industrial melanism in populations
of Biston betularia in Birmingham (Kettlewell 1955). The observation that melanic individuals
are less frequently preyed upon than ‘typical’ individuals suﬃces. But this D-selection explana-
tion is highly speciﬁc, and not generalizable. It does not tell us what would have happened if
the speciﬁc history of births and deaths in Birmingham had been slightly diﬀerent? Nor does
it identify the commonalities between the change in this population and (for example) the in-
crease in frequency of dark morph eastern grey squirrels (Sciurus carolinensis) in North America.
13The distinction is presaged by Lewontin’s (2001) distinction between ‘variational’ and ‘transforma-
tional’ explanations in biology.
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This is where MS-explanations come in. They apply to all populations in which the growth rate
of trait types vary, irrespective of how this variation is caused. After all, no two populations are
alike in every causal detail, but a wide range of them undergo the same type of changes in distri-
bution patterns (Woodward 2003; Sober 1983; Ariew, Rice, and Rohwer 2015). MS-models
demonstrate that change in trait structure is sensitive to diﬀerences in the statistical distribution
of a number of parameters.
Nor do statisticalists deny that higher order eﬀects can sometimes have ensemble-level
causes.14 For example, the bursting of a balloon under pressure is plausibly a higher order
eﬀect. It is a consequence of the collisions of gas molecules with the membrane of the balloon.
The balloon’s burst is also caused by the pressure of the air, which is the cumulative eﬀect of
the motions of the molecules. Pressure is an ensemble level property that causes a higher or-
der eﬀect.15 The diﬀerence between pressure bursting a balloon and MS-selection is that the
former is not an analytic consequence of individual-level processes. The aggregate motions of
individual molecules do not entail the bursting of the balloon; they cause it. Pressure is the sum
of forces exerted by individual molecules (per unit area, per unit time). The balloon pops when
the total force applied to it exceeds a certain threshold value.16
Trait ﬁtness is a primitive.
The crucial explanatory concept inMS-models is trait ﬁtness. Trait ﬁtness estimates the relative
growth rate of a trait type.17 The statistical interpretation holds that trait ﬁtness is a primitive
concept. It has no deﬁnition expressed in terms of any other parameter. In particular, (unlike
other aggregate-level parameters, e.g. pressure and temperature) it has no deﬁnition in terms
of the causal properties of individuals that make up an ensemble. In contrast, most causalists
seem to assume—and sometimes explicitly aver—that the concept of trait ﬁtness is derivative.
It is deﬁned as a function of individual causal properties (Beatty 1998; Beatty and Finsen 1998;
Pence and Ramsey 2015). It is frequently said that trait ﬁtness supervenes on vernacular ﬁtness
(Rosenberg 2008).
Philosophical folklore has it that the ﬁtness of a trait is the mean of the vernacular ﬁtnesses
of those individuals that possess the trait. Vernacular ﬁtness in turn is thought of as a propensity
of an individual (usually the propensity to reproduce). As vernacular ﬁtness is a causal property,
the supposition goes, the average of these properties must be a causal property too. It might be
thought of as the general contribution that a trait tokenmakes to the ﬁtness of an individual that
bears it (Gillespie 1977). Perhaps this is analogous to the average eﬀect that, say, a container of
steel pipes makes to the displacement of any ship that it might be loaded onto, or the average
contribution that a litre of petrol makes to the distance a car of a certain model can travel. This
is an appealing line of thought, but it should be resisted for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that trait
ﬁtness is typically not equivalent to average vernacular ﬁtness. The second concerns the role that
trait ﬁtness plays in MS-models.
Typically, average individual reproductive output is too crude as a representation of the ten-
dency of a trait type to increase or decrease in relative frequency (Gillespie 1977; Lande 1978).
14See Shapiro and Sober (2007) and Millstein (2006).
15Jackson and Pettit (1990) think that explanations that advert to pressure are mere ‘program explana-
tions,’ placeholders for the real, individual-level causal explanations. We’re happy to acknowledge that
these are perfectly good causal explanations.
16For more on this see Hacking (1990), and Ariew, Rice and Rohwer (2015) on statistically au-
tonomous explanation.
17Alternatively, the rate of change in mean character value of a trait type.
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Demographic factors, such as population size, age structure, and whether the population is grow-
ing or diminishing, also aﬀect the rate of change in frequency of a trait type. For instance, for
organisms with continuous reproduction and overlapping generations the average age at which
members of a type produce oﬀspring makes a diﬀerence to changes in population composition.
So even though one trait might be ‘ﬁtter’ in the sense that individuals with the trait
tend to survive or reproduce better than the alternative, the overall expectation as to
which trait will increase in the population must take into account all biasing eﬀects
from all processes causing evolutionary change. (Earnshaw-Whyte 2012, 409)
For another example, variance in reproductive output can make a diﬀerence to the change in
relative frequency of two trait types even if the types have the same mean reproductive output.
Furthermore, overall population size aﬀects the degree to which variance aﬀects changes in trait
frequency (Sober 2001; Orr 2007; Walsh 2015). As Sober (2001) astutely points out, if the rate
of growth of a trait type depends upon the number of organisms in the population (whether
they possess the trait or not), and average vernacular ﬁtness doesn’t, then the growth rate of a
type is not a function of the average ﬁtnesses of individuals possessing tokens of that type.
These considerations and others (discussed in Ariew and Lewontin 2004), suggest that the
rate of growth of a trait type is dependent upon all manner of causal, demographic, and statistical
factors that are extraneous to the average reproductive output of the individuals possessing a
given trait.
Earnshaw-Whyte (2012) calls the average vernacular ﬁtness of those organisms with a given
trait ‘narrow trait ﬁtness’ in contradistinction to ‘broad trait ﬁtness,’ which is the ‘all-things-
considered’ tendency of a trait type to increase or decrease in its relative frequency. He argues
that the ‘narrow’ ﬁtness of a trait is typically insuﬃcient to predict or explain the change in
relative frequency of that type.
By itself, this does not establish that the distribution of trait ﬁtnesses cannot be deﬁned in
terms of the properties of individuals in the population. Demographic factors, like population
growth, population size, age structure, reproductive schedule, and migration rate may well con-
tribute to trait ﬁtness. But these phenomena are ﬁxed by the properties of individual organisms.
That being so, the distribution of trait ﬁtnesses might still supervene on the properties of indi-
viduals in a population, even if it doesn’t supervene on vernacular ﬁtnesses. In that event, trait
ﬁtness distribution would not be a primitive. It would have a deﬁnition given exhaustively in
terms of the properties of individual organisms.
But a consideration of the role that trait ﬁtness distribution plays in MS-models shows this
idea to be implausible (Ariew and Ernst 2009). The processes that cause populations to change
are multifarious, spatially and temporally variable, and stochastic. MS-models only ever en-
compass a simpliﬁed, idealized, probabilistic summation of the suite of causes that a population
might encounter (Levins 1966;Weisberg 2006). Consequently, the distribution of trait ﬁtnesses
in a model renders a probability distribution over the range of possible population changes. We
can think of an actual population—the population whose dynamics is being modeled—as a sam-
ple drawn from an indeﬁnitely large source of possible populations, each of which is described
by the same model. Now, one obvious fact about samples is that they may misrepresent their
source population. Two samples may be identical, and yet be drawn from source populations
with diﬀerent statistical properties. It is entirely plausible, for example, that two runs of ten ﬂips
of diﬀerent coins may both produce ﬁve heads and ﬁve tails, and yet one coin be fair and the
other biased. Likewise, two populations could have an identical arrangement of individual-level
causal properties and yet diﬀer in their distribution of trait ﬁtnesses. That being so, trait ﬁtness
does not supervene on the sum of actual individual-level causes in a population.
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Two things follow. The ﬁrst is that the suite of actual individual-level causes of organisms
leaving, staying in, or entering a population underdetermines the distribution of trait ﬁtnesses.
Trait ﬁtness thus cannot be deﬁned in terms of the properties of actual individuals in a popula-
tion. The second is that trait ﬁtness is an abstraction. It is a statistical property of an idealized
population and cannot be deﬁned in terms of the properties of actual individuals in a concrete
population. Trait ﬁtness is thus best considered to be a primitive theoretical concept.
This claim should be diﬀerentiated from two previous attempts to establish the primitiveness
of trait ﬁtness (see Sober (2013) and Rosenberg and Williams (1986)). Elliott Sober (2013)
articulates a position in which trait ﬁtnesses play a primitive role in population models. This
sounds pretty close to the statisticalist view. However, Sober diverges from statisticalism in
three crucial ways. He holds that: (i) trait ﬁtnesses can be deﬁned in terms of vernacular ﬁtness
(ii) vernacular ﬁtness has no explanatory uses, and (iii) variation in trait ﬁtness causes evolution.
Statisticalists deny all three of these theses. Similarly, Rosenberg andWilliams (1986) posit the
primitiveness of trait ﬁtness, in order to include it as a term in an axiomatic formal syntactic
account of the logical structure of evolutionary theory. This is no part of the statisticalist strategy.
The statisticalist position on trait ﬁtness derives from an observation of their role inMS-models.
Population dynamics models are substrate neutral.
A model is a partial, indirect representation of an object of study, in this case, a biological
population. Presumably, no single workable model could include all the highly speciﬁc causal
details of change in population structure and capture the dynamics of populations in their full
generality (even if it were desirable to do so). So, we must make choices about what factors
to represent, which details to idealize and which to leave out. These choices are guided by
pragmatic considerations. There are a number of strategies available to modelers (Levins 1966).
One is to sacriﬁce realism for generality and precision (Weisberg 2006). This is what MS-
models do. They render highly general and precise descriptions of the dynamics of populations—
construed as ensembles of abstract types—at the cost of leaving out all the strictly biological
details.
MS-models make only minimal metaphysical demands on the populations to which they are
applied. The conditions for applying an MS-model may be realized in biological populations,
but virtually nothing of what makes a biological population biological is explicitly represented in
the model (Stegenga 2014). Matthen and Ariew (2002), for example, argue that one can think
of an MS-model as an instance of Li’s theorem:
Li’s theorem: in a subdivided population the rate of change in the overall growth
rate is proportional to the variance in growth rates.
Li’s theorem identiﬁes a regularity, but not an expressly biological one.
Winther et al. (2015) draw the helpful distinction between biological populations and theo-
retical populations. Biological populations may all be theoretical populations, but not vice versa.
Biological populations are those in which organisms partake in the processes of birth, death, and
reproduction (inter alia). Theoretical populations are those that meet the minimal conditions re-
quired for the application of a MS-model.18 These conditions are so minimal that MS-models
are equally applicable to a wide range of non-biological ensembles. As Li’s theorem suggests,
they can apply to any system in which persistent types vary in their growth rates. Darwinian se-
lection in biological populations is one way of meeting the conditions, but there are many others.
18Millstein (2006) and Gildenhuys (2014), for example, erroneously suppose that being a biological
population is a necessary condition for the application of an MS-model.
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Orr (2007) and Walsh (2015), for example, discuss how the models that describe the change in
relative frequency of traits in a population undergoing selection can also be used to represent
the change in relative growth rates of competing investment portfolios. Hodgson and Knudsen
(2010) make the point that evolutionary models apply to business practices, legal systems and
technological change, just as well as to biological populations. In this sense, MS-models are
substrate neutral (Matthen and Ariew 2002). On account of their substrate neutrality, MS-
explanations say nothing about the distinctly biological processes that bring about population
change.
This does not make MS-models useless—far from it. The loss of speciﬁc causal detail is
more than compensated by a gain in generality. MS-models enable biologists to identify, mea-
sure, and project regularities at the level of the dynamics of ensembles that cannot be described
without ascending to an ontology of abstract trait types and their growth rates (Walsh, Lewens,
and Ariew 2002; Walsh 2003). They articulate the ways in which the rate, direction and mag-
nitude of change in the trait distribution of an assemblage counterfactually depend upon its
statistical structure. These regularities are largely insensitive to the speciﬁcally biological details.
MS-models capture evolutionary phenomena in their full generality, as they apply equally to
populations of Latimeria and Laminaria, bacteria colonies and Bactrian camels, and much more
besides.
MS-Selection and drift are model-relative.
As we have said, an MS-model is a highly simpliﬁed, abstract and idealized representation of
biological reality. The choices that an investigator makes in constructing a model are guided
by her objectives. As objectives may vary, a population may have many diﬀerent MS-models
depending on which features the investigator chooses to accentuate, ignore, or idealize. Trait
ﬁtnesses are assigned relative to an MS-model. If MS-selection and drift are deﬁned in terms
of variation in trait ﬁtnesses, then they too are attributed to a population relative to a model.
For certain purposes it might be prudent to describe a population as varying in trait ﬁtnesses,
while for others the most apt description of the same population may be one in which there is no
variation in trait ﬁtness.19 We can only say, then, that a population varies in its trait ﬁtness with
respect to some model or other. Consequently, we can only say that a population is undergoing
MS-selection, or drift, or both, relative to an MS-model. It follows that there is no model-
independent fact of the matter whether a population is undergoingMS-selection, drift, or both.
A toy scenario might help to illustrate.20
Suppose we are following the growth of a founding population of 20 asexually reproducing
individuals in which there are two true-breeding variant traits H :T . Reproduction is synchro-
nized, and each individual reproduces once and then dies, so there are no overlapping genera-
tions. There are 10H individuals, and 10 T , each produces on average 5 oﬀspring per year. The
types are diﬀerentially sensitive to temperature. H individuals are ﬁtter than T individuals in
warmer than average years (whereH individuals produce 6 oﬀspring and T individuals produce
4). T individuals are ﬁtter thanH individuals in cooler than average years (whereH individuals
produce 4 oﬀspring and T individuals produce 6). During our eight year study there is a run
of six warm years (w) and two cool (c) as follows: w;w;w; c; w; w; c; w. The change in trait
distribution is given in Table 1.
The question is how we should describe the dynamics of this population. On one hand, this
looks to be a genuine case of MS-selection. The ﬁtnesses of the trait types vary over the run
19A number of arguments have been oﬀered by Walsh (2007, 2010, 2013, 2015).
20Adapted from Walsh (2013).
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Table 1: Change in frequency of traits H and T over a run of eight years
# of oﬀspring Relative frequency at the end of year …
Trait type warm cool 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H 6 4 .60 .69 .77 .69 .77 .84 .88 .84
T 4 6 .40 .31 .23 .31 .23 .16 .12 .16
of years: H is ﬁtter than T (average reproductive output: H = 5:5; T = 4:5). Variation in
ﬁtness predicts and explains the increase in H relative to T . On the other hand, this also looks
like a case of drift without selection. Ex hypothesi, over long stretches of time the ﬁtnesses of
H and T are equal. We should predict no net increase in the frequency of one over the other.
However, this sample of six warm years and two cool years misrepresents the long-term run of
years. There is sample error here—drift.
So, there are two distinct MS-models of this population. There is a ‘selection’ model in
which wH > wT , and a ‘drift’ model in which wH = wT . The important point is that each
of these models is well-suited to a diﬀerent explanatory project. The description that attributes
MS-selection and no drift to the population tells us that the change in population structure is
entirely predictable. It further demonstrates what this population, over this stretch of time, has
in common with other populations in which trait ﬁtnesses vary in the same way. Yet, if we were
to project this variation in ﬁtness over a prolonged period of years, this model wouldmisrepresent
the change in the population. The description in which there is drift and no MS-selection, by
contrast, underscores the fact that this run of eight years is something of a statistical anomaly.
In any arbitrarily chosen run of eight years it would be unlikely that we should ﬁnd such a skew
in the conditions beneﬁcial to H and detrimental to T . The no-ﬁtness-variation description
demonstrates what this run of eight years has in common with any other arbitrarily chosen
sequence of years. While the wH = wT fails to predict the population change over the run of
eight years, it should fare better over other arbitrarily chosen runs of eight years, over extended
periods of time, and for other populations of H and T individuals. So, both models are correct.
The upshot is that a population can only be said to be undergoing MS-selection or drift relative
to a model.
What is not model-relative is the change in trait structure of the population. Any way you
slice the cake, there are more Hs than T s, at the end of the eight years, and that requires an
explanation. Both causal and statistical interpretations agree that MS-models explain this. The
statistical interpretation further holds that whether MS-selection is occurring in a population
simply depends on how the population is described.
The model relativity of MS-selection and drift marks a watershed between the statistical
and causal interpretations. The model-relativity of MS-selection and drift sits uneasily with the
causal interpretation, while it is perfectly consonant with statisticalism.
The tension betweenmodel-relativity and the causal interpretation arises from the commonly-
held intuition that causal relations are objective, description-independent features of the world.
That is to say, for any X for any Y , there is an objective matter of fact whether X is a cause of
Y , irrespective of how X and Y are described.21 That being so, if MS-selection and drift are
21Caution is required here. Many approaches to modeling causation, e.g. Woodward (2003), allow
that diﬀerent causal models may describe the same system diﬀerently. For example, one model may
represent electromagnetic force and gravitational force, but not displacement, mass or charge as distinct
causes, while another may represent displacement, mass and charge as causes, without explicitly repre-
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causes, then for any population change, there should be a description-independent fact of the
matter whether it is a case of selection, or drift, or a combination of the two. If there is a model-
independent matter of fact in our toy scenario that wH > wT , for example, then it is just not
true that wH = wT . The models cannot both apply to the same population consistently. The
causal interpretation has two options. It might accept that both models describe this population,
and thereby accept a contradiction—that selection objectively both is and isn’t the cause of the
population change. Alternatively, it might (arbitrarily) reject one or the other models as false
(see Abrams 2013), and thereby forfeit the explanation that it oﬀers (Walsh 2007).22
The statistical interpretation encounters no such diﬃculty. It denies that MS-selection and
drift are causes of population change. They are merely features of a statistical description of
the population. Whether a population is undergoing MS-selection, or drift, or both is only a
fact about how the population is described. One and the same system may be susceptible to
diﬀerent statistical descriptions. As statistical descriptions, both the wH > wT and wH = wT
models are correct. Their correctness is borne out in their empirical success. According to
one description, there is MS-selection and no drift; according to the other, there is drift and
no MS-selection. But there is no inconsistency, as a population can be said to be undergoing
MS-selection, drift, or both only relative to a model.
Description dependence underscores a signiﬁcant contrast between Darwinian natural se-
lection and Modern Synthesis natural selection. D-selection, just like change in trait structure,
is description in-dependent. D-selection occurs when organisms survive and reproduce diﬀer-
entially on account of their vernacular ﬁtnesses (which as we have seen are causal propensities).
Vernacular ﬁtnesses are non-model-relative. If two D-models assign incompatible vernacular
ﬁtnesses to the organisms in our toy scenario, for example, then at least one of them is wrong.
The error will show up in the model’s lack of empirical success.23 This is a crucial diﬀerence
between D-selection and MS-selection that usually goes unnoticed. Part of the confusion sur-
rounding the causalist/statisticalist debate, we conjecture, stems from a general failure to distin-
guish model-relative MS-selection (and drift) from description-independent D-selection, and
a concomitant failure to draw the distinction between MS-models that ascribe trait ﬁtnesses
and D-models that ascribe vernacular ﬁtnesses.
5 Conclusion
The statistical interpretation holds thatMS-models of evolutionary change are statistical models.
They cite trait ﬁtnesses, the diﬀerential growth rates of abstract trait types. Trait ﬁtness is not
a causal property of a concrete entity. It is a statistical property of an abstract entity. MS-
Selection occurs when there is variation in trait ﬁtnesses in a population. MS-selection is not to
be conﬂated with the Darwinian process of selection (D-selection), in which individuals survive
and reproduce diﬀerentially according to their own causal propensities. D-selection may be
realized as MS-selection (and vice versa), but they are diﬀerent processes. Much of the debate
concerning the statistical interpretation of evolutionary theory over that last 15 years stems from
a tendency to conﬂate these two processes. Moreover, the debate has systematically conﬂated
senting gravitational or electromagnetic force. But this does not entail that these causal relations are
model-relative. It simply means that the objective causal relations can be described in multiple, mutually
consistent ways. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
22A third, we suggest heroic, alternative would be to reject the description independence of causal
relations. See Northcott (2010).
23The error, of course, is not statistical error (Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002). Drift does not ﬁgure
in D-models.
 open access - ptpbio.org
walsh, ariew, matthen: four pillars 15
two kinds of evolutionary models, D-models and MS-models. The distinctions are important.
D-selection models are causal; MS-selection models are not. MS-selection is model relative;
D-selection is not.
The statistical interpretation is exclusively a claim about MS-selection and its models. It has
nothing to say about D-selection, or D-models. It makes the following claims:
Positive Claim #1: MS-models cite statistical properties of trait types.
Positive Claim #2: MS-models explain changes in trait distribution.
Negative Claim: MS-models do not cite the causes of population change.
These claims are supported by the following commitments:
1. Natural Selection is a higher order eﬀect.
2. Trait ﬁtness is primitive.
3. MS-models are substrate neutral.
4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative.
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